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This paper contributes to the partial resolution of the debate regarding the role of  
governments in leading national upskilling efforts through a descriptive case study of the 
Singapore system of skills development.  The paper identifies the major reasons behind 
Singapore’s remarkable success in upgrading workforce skills in a relatively short period 
of 40 years. First, a general linkage between economic development needs and skill 
formation and development has been facilitated by an institutional structure that places 
the Economic Development Board at the center of the effort with responsibility for both 
areas. We argue that this general linkage is a necessary but insufficient condition for 
rapid skills upgradation. Second, the EDB’s model of technology transfer, which over a 
period of time brought about the  integration of three crucial aspects, i.e., linking foreign 
direct investment to skills development and joint government-private sector operation for 
skills training, was crucial in the ability of the economy to meet its short and medium 
term skills development needs. Third, educational reform for long term skills 
development and fourth, a levy/grant scheme (the Skills development Funds) that 
induced private sector firms to invest in upskilling were important contributors to the 
success of the system. Finally, the institutional linkages across various different skills 
development institutions and initiatives further ensured the effectiveness and relevance of 
upskilling programs i.e., the interconnectedness of the various parts of the system was a 
crucial element in the success of the Singapore effort.  In sum, Singapore’s system is 
consistent with the notion of a concerted national effort. Given that several nations have 
indicated their desire to copy selected aspects of the Singapore system (e.g., skills 
development funds) this paper cautions that it is important to understand that each 
component works because of the institutional context, and cannot be transplanted 
independently to a different  institutional context and be expected to provide the same 
results.  
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How Do Nations Increase  Workforce Skills? Factors Influencing the Success 
of the Singapore Skills Development System.  
Introduction 
Although there is agreement that most developing nations need to focus on skills 
development in order to meet the challenges in and from international markets, there is 
considerable disagreement regarding what strategies nations should follow to upgrade 
workforce skills.  The question of skills upgradation is relevant for all types of 
economies, both developed and developing. For developed nations, as Streeck (1988) 
notes, high skills are the only route that advanced economies can sustain in the long run, 
given that their comparative advantage lies in their technological innovation and 
capabilities.  For developing nations, the comparative advantage of low labor costs 
erodes rapidly, and the need to raise the technology and skill-intensity of their 
manufacturing sectors requires serious consideration of the skill upgradation question. 
For example, in Asia, the emergence of Indonesia, Vietnam, and China as new centers for 
low cost production have made it necessary for the NIC’s (S. Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, 
Hong Kong) to adopt a more technology intensive export oriented industrialization, for 
which skills up-gradation is critically necessary. As Koike (1996 ) has pointed out, the 
quality of  human resource skills are critical for these countries to maintain their 
competitive position with the more technology intensive export orientation strategies they 
have adopted. 
In addition, the need for developing workforce skills is rendered more acute given 
the increasingly wide wage differentials between skilled and unskilled workers, and that 
fact that  much of the ranks of the unemployed consist of people who are unskilled or 
with low levels of skills.  Further, both technological change and international trade in 
this era transform labor markets continually, changing the nature of jobs and the rate at 
which skills become obsolescent.  Several authors have noted that the success of the 
NIC’s is in part due to their human resource-led development strategies and that other 
nations wanting to change the basis of their comparative advantage from cheap labor or 
natural resources to technology and skill, should follow their example (Godfrey, 1997).    
  Despite work that has outlined the linkage between economic development and 
national human resource and labor policies (Kuruvilla, 1996),  there is little agreement on 
 3
just how nations can develop an effective strategy of upskilling. Much of the debate 
centers around the role of the government and its ability to raise workforce skills. Those 
arguing against a heavy government role highlight the inefficiency of government 
(markets are more efficient than governments in allocating resources for skill 
upgradation), and provide debatable empirical evidence on the failure of many 
government sponsored efforts in the advanced nations. Those in favor of government-led 
efforts talk about the many positive externalities of government –led skill development 
(e.g., the value of a well educated workforce),  the need to get involved due to market 
failure (due to inadequate information, labor market rigidities, imperfect capital markets 
and other institutional factors), and to compensate for the inequalities imposed by 
markets (inequalities in the distribution of skills development opportunities).   Pervasive 
empirical support for either perspective is absent, due to a number of data and 
measurement problems, hence the continuing debate.  
 This paper contributes to a partial resolution of this debate by examining one 
concrete and successful case of skills development, i.e. the case of Singapore, and 
drawing lessons from this case for other developing nations. Our methodology involved 
both archival research and interviews with knowledgeable “experts” in Singapore, and 
represents a tentative effort to identify why the system has proved successful in 
Singapore.  We want to make it very clear that this is a descriptive paper. We do not have 
the data to conduct a full scale evaluation of the Singapore system  (a focus of our future 
work) but we also recognize that we would have to devise a unique evaluation plan for a 
system that has so many interconnected components to it.  In the following section, we 
(briefly) review  relevant literature regarding skills development and international 
competitiveness, and the debate as to who should be responsible for skills development. 
Next, we discuss why Singapore is an appropriate case for this kind of inquiry, followed 
by our analysis of the factors that are important in the success of the important features of 
the Singapore’s system.  
Relevant Literature     
 
 While it is not our purpose to review the considerable literature on the 
significance of skills development in a nation’s competitiveness, we think a brief outline 
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of the theoretical basis for this claim is necessary in providing a context to understand  
why Singapore is an appropriate case to study. A variety of theoretical perspectives have 
been offered as conceptual lenses to examine the nature, and process, of national skills 
development. In our review below, we focus primarily on the importance of skills in 
economic development, the process, and debates regarding who is responsible for  
national skills development.  
The Importance of Skills in Economic Competitiveness 
  
Both economic growth theories and trade theories have noted the importance of 
skills development in economic competitiveness.  Behrman (1997) suggests that the New 
Neo-classical Growth Models” have  renewed the interest in the aggregate relations 
between human resources and economic development. Several works are relevant here. 
Romer, (1986) for example  develops a model whereby long run growth is driven by the 
accumulation of knowledge, and that the production of consumption goods as a function 
of the stock of knowledge  has increasing returns, and the stock of knowledge may have 
an increasing marginal product in such use. This model implies a very important role for 
skills and HR in economic development, and that focusing on HR in terms of policy may 
have a social payoff because of both externalities and the increasing returns associated 
with HR investments.  
Lucas (1988) builds on Solow’s (1956) model by suggesting that the average 
level of human capital affects a workers productivity in addition to the effect of his or her 
own human capital, suggesting the need to invest in human capital economy-wide, while 
Azariades and Drazen (1991)  argue that countries with higher human capital investments 
relative to their per capita income are more capable of sustained economic growth than 
others. Stokey (1991)  suggests that human capital investments have a positive impact on 
the human capital of later cohorts so average human capital grows over time, and so does 
the quality of production.  Thus, the implication of these studies are that investments in 
human capital are critical for economic growth.  
Researchers linking human capital investments to foreign trade tend to use the 
standard Heckscher-Ohlin model. The general approach here is to view workforce skills 
and perhaps land as non tradeable factors of production and then examine the relative 
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endowments of these factors to suggest the comparative advantage of manufacturing and 
primary products. Wood (1994) and Godfrey (1997) tend to use this approach.  
 Several authors, like Godfrey (1997) have focused on the process of transition of 
economies from low cost labor to skill intensive labor, and the arguments are also 
relevant for our study here. The central feature for example, in classical models of 
economic development by Lewis (1954) is that unlimited supplies of labor at the initial 
stage of economic development contribute to continued growth in the industrial sector. 
However the unlimited labor supply does not last as the industrial sector increases in size, 
and with real wages rising the labor supply curve slopes upwards. The assumption is that 
economies have to reach the stage of labor shortage before the transition to skill based 
competitiveness can occur.  However, this transition is based on a number  of other 
factors, notably a sustained growth in wage employment in manufacturing accompanied 
by productivity growth, a rise in the real product wage of unskilled labor and a narrowing 
of wage differentials between more or less qualified workers, and  a supply of better 
educated labor in the senior secondary and tertiary sectors. And here, the quantity and the 
quality are necessary to make the transition to skill based competitiveness.  Godfrey 
(1991) suggests that Indonesia has met this condition.  
 Another set of scholars link skills development to general levels of economic 
development not through trade, but through foreign investment. Both Koike (1996) and 
Kuruvilla (1996) suggest that investment in human resources generally and developing 
specific skills determines the amount and nature of foreign investment.  Nations with 
abundant supplies of skills, other things equal will attract greater foreign investment 
generally, but will also attract the type of foreign investment that is targeted, for example, 
Singapore and Malaysia’s success at attracting investment in the semiconductor sector 
depended to some extent on their ability to produce the skills that that sector needed 
(Kuruvilla 1996).  
 Despite the existence of such frameworks, the empirical support for these 
perspectives is less than persuasive, for a number of reasons. One exception is the  
report in the “East Asian Miracle Book” (World Bank 1993) which found that an increase 
of 10 percentage points in primary or secondary education would increase the rate of 
growth by 3%. Otherwise, studies have demonstrated two major problems. The first 
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problem is conceptual i.e, even if the theory tells us that human resources is important for 
economic development, there are enough examples of nations or regions within with poor 
economic performance despite high investments in skills (e.g., Philippines, Sri Lanka). 
Then in many cases, human resource development appears to follow economic 
development, rather than to lead it.   The second problem is empirical, caused in large 
part by problems in measurement. For the most part, the empirical studies equate human 
resource development with education (since education is a convenient and handy 
measure). Yet, skills development is larger than basic education, as it involves training at 
different levels and within firms as well.  Databases on skill levels and vocational 
training are not easily available nor systematically maintained in most developing 
nations.  It is this problem of getting appropriate data that lead Godfrey (1997) and others 
to suggest that various studies that have suggested the importance of human resources in 
changing Korea’s comparative advantage are purely speculative.  Given that appropriate 
data is not available, this calls for different methods to address this problem, notably case 
studies of successful efforts in order to understand the process.   
The Role of the government: What should Governments do?  
 The paucity of empirical work noted in respect of the relationship between skills 
development and economic growth is matched by the paucity of empirical work 
regarding the appropriate role of the government (but see Barro, 1997).  The arguments 
however are more clear. There are those who argue that governments should not be 
involved in the skills development effort.  
One argument  is that governments are not successful or efficient at upgrading 
national skills, largely because markets are more efficient at allocating resources for skill 
development and upgrading (See a 1996 debate on this issue in the Economist, April 6,  
pp 19-21). Proponents of this view cite evidence, using diverse studies of  Germany’s 
dual education system, apprenticeship training in Britain, and studies of the job training 
partnership act in the US, to suggest that government-led efforts do not work. 
A second argument is based on Becker’s (1967) work. Becker distinguishes  between 
general and specific skills.  General skills are the province of the employee and it is 
reasonable to expect that individuals would make an effort to invest in human capital to 
maximize their earnings and employment opportunities. Specific skills refers to those 
 7
skills specific to each employer, that are generally not marketable outside, and thus, 
employers would provide these skills.  The implication of this is there is little role for 
government in taking the lead in workforce skills development, beyond the necessary 
investment sin education.  
 Several arguments in favor  of government involvement in skills development 
exist.  One argument cites the positive externalities in skills development i.e., the value of 
a well educated work-force in general which helps the ability of a nation to adjust quickly 
due to changes in technology and markets, and these positive externalities will not result 
if left to the market.  A second argument focuses on the various unrealistic assumptions 
of Becker’s (1967) work i.e., there is no uncertainty as to the value of future returns to 
training, no limitations on the possibility of borrowing to finance one’s own skills and no 
turnover of workers who receive specific training from employers. Given that none of 
these assumptions are satisfied in practice, the  implication is that government should 
step in to improve the market (for general skills), through the provision of better 
information and the development of institutions to finance individual skills acquisition. A 
third argument focuses on the various other factors that cause market failure, such as 
inadequate information,  labor market rigidities, imperfect capital markets , and a host of 
institutional factors, (e.g.,  short term financial markets, adversarial craft unions, weak 
employer organizations) that cause employers to adopt lower skill strategies than their 
rivals in other countries. A fourth argument for government involvement rests on the 
premise that a market led system will result in inequality in the distribution of skills 
development opportunities. In an attempt at reconciliation, Behrman (1997)  basically 
suggests that the role of the government is to identify market failures and to considering 
whether they can be remedied by reasonable marginal social cost by improving markets 
or by other means. Thus, the only justification is that social returns must be higher than 
private returns. Proponents would suggest the use of active labor market policies such as 
those that operate in Scandinavia, but it is not clear that developing nations can afford to 
introduce those kinds of systems.  And it is also not clear that such interventions would 
prevent market failure.  Notably, the studies that have examined market failure have 
looked at vocational training (in countries of the West where reasonably good data exist 
on these issues), but this is not the same for developing nations.  
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 There is a small literature that has examined ways to improve government’s 
intervention by comparing different models of government intervention.  Edwards (1997) 
for example suggests that there are three models of government intervention. One is what 
he calls the state training model where governments both pays for and runs training 
centers for the industry, the second is the voluntarist model, where government provides 
the finance and employers provide the training, or levy/grant systems where the employer 
is taxed on payroll but gets the tax reimbursed if he actually gets involved in training.  
Edwards does suggest  however that the weakest model in developing countries  
(in terms of providing incentives for individual incentives for skill acquisition or 
corporate efforts at improving skills) is the state directed  model. Its weaknesses include 
the fact that it is supply driven, poorly motivated students are trained in out of date skills 
and fail to get good job offers from employers, cost ineffectiveness of various programs, 
focus on training the unemployed as a political response to recessions poor management 
etc.  The levy/grant system presents a way out of these problems, by forcing employers to 
invest in skills upgrading.  
 There is also some research that has made arguments about why some models of 
government intervention work. Edwards (1997)  in reviewing several cases, suggests for 
example that the dual system in Germany works because of the general willingness (and 
ability) of companies to take a long term view, the presence of unions that are in favor of 
such systems, a high level of trust given the institutional context in which it operates and 
strong collective employer and employee organizations. The Japanese company training 
system works because it is buttressed by lifetime employment and low levels of inter-
firm mobility (by itself a major market imperfection) as a result of the peculiar 
characteristics of the Japanese system. 
Singh (1990) offers a perspective that supports government intervention 
generally,  but is also more prescriptive. Singh argues that for countries to remain 
competitive via upskilling, there must be a concerted national effort, and in particular, 
government and industry must join hands to tailor the country’s education and training 
systems, amongst others things, to meet the skill needs elicited by new technology and 
the increasingly global economy. For Singh therefore, all the three models suggested by 
Edwards need to be used in conjunction for successful skills development. There have 
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been no empirical studies as yet that support’s Singh’s perspective either.   
What appears to be required are good case studies of success and failure. This 
paper aims at analyzing one highly successful effort at “upskilling” i.e. that of Singapore. 
Arguably, studying a concrete case of  skill up-gradation  inductively will yield valuable 
policy lessons for other developing nations, but also shed light on the as yet unresolved 
debate about skill up-gradation noted above. 
 
Singapore as an Example.  
 
Given the above perspectives, why is Singapore a good case to examine?  
First,  Singapore is probably the best known prototype of a nation that has successfully 
up-skilled its work-force over the last 40 years.  For the fifth consecutive year, the World 
Economic Forum has rated Singapore’s labor force first in terms of computer literacy, 
and second in the world in terms of availability of skilled people as well as worker 
motivation. The World Competitiveness Yearbook 1996 rated Singapore’s education 
system first in terms of its ability to meet the “needs of a competitive economy”. And the 
various executive opinion surveys reported in the World Competitiveness Report suggest 
that Singapore is ranked number 1 amongst all developing nations in terms of  a number 
of human resource dimensions, including the availability of skilled people, equal 
opportunity, industrial disputes, worker motivation, attitude of the workforce, and 
competitive values.  Finally, the biggest piece of international research on education 
standards (the Third International Maths and Science Study, 1997), which compared the 
scores of 13 year olds in math and science, placed Singapore at the top, in both math and 
science. (In comparison, the United States placed 17th in science and 28th in Math). On 
both education and training dimensions of national  human resource development 
therefore, Singapore’s achievements  are excellent. The institutional features that account 
for such accolades is the subject of this paper. 
 In more specific terms, the number of people with tertiary level qualifications 
increased at an average annual rate of 10% between 1983 and 1993. By 1997, almost all 
junior and middle level managerial and supervisory positions are held by local 
Singaporeans as are a significant proportion of executives and managerial ones, even in 
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wholly owned subsidiaries of MNC’s. For a more comprehensive listing of the evidence, 
see Cheah (1997).   Between 1970 and 1991, human capital and technology intensive 
products rose from 14% to 54% of the total value of Singapore’s exports. Most 
importantly, the annual average growth rates of graduates from post-school educational 
and training institutions over a the 1983-1993 period was high, as the following Table 
suggests. 
Table 1: Average Annual Growth Rates of Graduates, 1983-1993. 
Institutions                     Average Annual Growth Rate 
Universities                               8.1 
Polytechnics                            10.1 
ITE Courses                             16.1 
NPB Courses                           14.7 
SIM Courses                            18.4 
SIHRM Courses                       24.2 
ISS Courses                              15.2 
OSH Courses                            34.0 
Source: Cheah, 1997.  
    
 Second, there is some evidence that Singapore’s efforts are consistent with some 
of the theoretical perspectives noted above, while in other ways it is remarkably 
inconsistent. Cheah (1997) notes that Singapore’s experience is consistent with both the 
economic growth and trade theories. For instance, Singapore experienced  rising wage 
costs, narrowing of skilled versus unskilled wage differentials, and labor shortages before 
it moved to a higher value added production system,, consistent with Godfrey’s  (1991) 
arguments. Singapore’s experience appears consistent with the notions of  a link between 
foreign investment and skills development highlighted by Koike (1996), while the Skills 
development Fund system is consistent with Edwards idea that levy/grant systems are the 
best model of government intervention.  On the other hand, and consistent with Singh 
(1991), Singapore’s effort was clearly led by the government, includes all of the various 
models noted by Edwards. Given the diversity of views, an  analysis of the institutional 
features that make Singapore’s model successful are clearly warranted. 
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 Third, one strong indicator of success is if other nations want to emulate. It is 
clear that that several other nations have attempted or are thinking of attempting to 
emulate the Singapore model. Malaysia, for example, has introduced some features of the 
Singapore model (Kuruvilla, 1996) while there is debate in India and several other 
countries regarding introducing the skills development fund system, the part of the 
Singapore model that has been most popular and most analyzed and described. Given the 
axiom in comparative industrial relations that specific institutions work in some countries 
because of the institutional setting in which they operate and will not deliver the same 
results when transplanted across nations with different institutional contexts, it would 
seem important to understand the institutional context behind Singapore’s successful 
effort. And, contrary to popular belief, the introduction of the levy/grant system is not the 
sole cause for success here.  
Method 
 We want to make it clear that the purpose of this paper is to describe and  identify 
the various factors that appear to be important in making the overall skills building 
system successful. However, at best, our conclusions can only be seen as tentative, given 
that we have relied on archival sources, and a few interviews with a  non representative 
sample of government officers and executives (This is the first stage of our research 
project).  Importantly, we do not have a direct measure of the effectiveness of 
Singapore’s skills development policy, (it is not clear that measures of number s of 
people trained will capture the effectiveness). Instead, we take the effectiveness as a 
given, in view of the international accolades that Singapore has received, and survey data 
used by the World Competitiveness forum that provides Singapore with the Number 1 
ranking.  
 What we did was to examine government documents, interactions between 
different institutions in Singapore, and used the snowball sampling method of 
interviewing key officers of both government institutions as well as private sector firms 
and getting them to suggest the names of others who would be useful to talk to.   This, 
what we present here is not the results of a systematic research project, but represents an 
effort to gain an initial understanding so that a more systematic research effort can be 
mounted.  
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 Further, given the length limitations for this journal, we do not focus on detailed 
descriptions of the Singapore system. Given the early stages of our research project, we 
do not make judgments regarding which factors are more important than others, nor have 
we designed a research procedure  (at this stage) to answer the relative importance 
question. The Singapore story however suggests that a number of institutions and 
linkages across institutions play a key role.    
 
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE SUCCESS OF THE SINGAPOREAN 
SKILLS DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM.    
 Our research project  has identified a number of important issues in the Singapore 
system, and we discuss each separately below.  The first factor is a rather basic one and is 
consistent with Kuruvilla’s (1996) argument that there should be a close correspondence 
between national human resource policies and  economic development policies. In what 
follows, it is our intention to briefly outline this correspondence vis-à-vis skills 
development and  economic development. We view this correspondence (the integration 
of economic development policies and skills development) as a necessary condition for 
successful skills development, albeit not a sufficient one.  
   
1. The linkage between skills development and economic development.  
Singapore’s skills development policies have been integrated with its  economic 
development strategy, through a variety of institutional mechanisms. Thus, upskilling is a 
continuous and expanding process that is based on economic development needs. A key 
element facilitating this linkage is the institutional structure that places the Economic 
Development Board at the center of the effort in that it is responsible for both economic 
development as well as skills development (see Figures 1 and 2). This mechanism allows 
the linkage to be fairly tightly coupled. This is in sharp contrast to the experience of most 
developing nations, where the  responsibility for economic development rests with the 
education ministry while responsibility for skills development rests with the Human 
resources ministry and with little interaction between the two.  
 We present an abbreviated discussion below of the phases of Singapore’s 
economic development and the skills development initiatives associated with each 
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economic development phase. More detailed descriptions of these initiatives can be 
found in Chua and Kuruvilla, 1997.    Note further that the we focus only on skills 
development here although it is worth note that there is a correspondence between other 
industrial relations  policies and economic development strategies as well.  
Phase 1: Import Substitution Industrialization: 1959-1965 
 In 1959, Singapore’s unemployment rate was 13.5% the population was poorly 
educated, poverty levels were high, and its traditional entrepot activities were in decline 
given the development of other  trade routes to the West (Huff, 1994). Given its position 
as part of the Malayan federation, the economic development  strategy adopted  was one 
of import substitution industrialization based on labor intensive industries. During this 
period, three critical human resource development challenges were addressed.  
 The most critical human resource challenge was the need to create a more 
integrated education system to meet the goals of the import substitution industrialization, 
notes  Soon (1993). Until this point, the colonial education system had emphasized the 
production of English speaking white collar workers for the bureaucracy, neglecting 
technical and vocational education. But ISI implied the need for trained industrial 
workers.  And efforts at reforming education to meet industrial needs were fragmented 
and slow given the political uncertainty connected with the link with the Malaya 
federation. 
 The essential elements of the first five year plan for education included the 
building of new schools to promote universal access, increasing the emphasis on science, 
mathematics, and technical education, while highlighting the importance of  bilingual 
education, with opportunities to follow education in English and all the three languages 
used by the population i.e., Malay, Mandarin, and Tamil (Soon (1993), and Chow, Phoon 
and Law, 1996).   
 The second challenge was to increase workforce skills in the general and 
technical area. The most significant initiative was the establishment of the Economic 
Development Board (1961). Although the board was established in order to design and 
implement an industrial policy, most of the boards’ efforts during this period was to plan 
the development of infrastructure and facilities that would be necessary for 
industrialization. In particular, the board was charged with the responsibility of 
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promoting foreign investment in Singapore (even during its ISI phase) given the lack of 
local capital and entrepreneurial ability to start ISI industries.  As part of the development 
of infrastructure, training of workers and managers was a critical requirement. A series of 
secondary schools, commercial high schools and vocational institutions were established. 
In particular, the Singapore Polytechnic, and the Ngee Ann technical college (one public, 
the other private) were expanded and restructured to accommodate the new courses that 
were relevant to the industrialization needs at that time.  (Vente and Chow, 1984). 
 A third challenge was the need for the development of management education, as 
Singapore did not have a corps of trained entrepreneurs. Management training was 
accomplished through the establishment of the Technical Constancy Unit and the 
Manpower development unit under the Economic Development Board. These two units 
operated in consultation with the fledgling Singapore Manufacturing Association, the 
existing universities and polytechnics and the adult education board, and provided 
management training until 1964, when this function was taken over by the Singapore 
Institute of Management.  
 Although the economy did not expand substantially during this period, the 
education reform was clearly successful. Primary school enrollment increased by 33.1% 
between 1960 and 1965 (Soon 1993). Secondary school enrollment increased by 93.7% 
and university and college enrollments increased by 69%. In addition, the technical and 
vocational institutes that were started in 1960 showed enrollments of 1200 workers by 
1965.  
 Thus, this phase marked the beginnings of education reform, extension of 
vocational, technical and managerial education, and established the supremacy of the  
EDB as the prime mover of Singapore’s industrialization strategy, and therefore also as 
the principal institution  responsible for the coordination and supply of manpower to 
meet Singapore’s manpower needs. As we shall see later, vesting the responsibility for 
provision of skilled manpower for economic development needs to the EDB proved 
useful later on. However, during this phase, the EDB focused only on the national level, 
and not on the industry or firm levels.  
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Phase 2: Export Oriented Industrialization:  1966-1973 
 The loss of the large Malaya internal market resulting from the  separation of 
Malaysia and Singapore in 1963, high levels of unemployment at about 10% as a result 
of the closure of the British naval base, and the negative impact the ISI strategy had on 
the balance of payments forced Singapore to adopt an export oriented industrialization 
strategy by August 1965 (Huff, 1994). The EOI strategy was predicated on attraction of 
foreign investment through a variety of incentives, and Singapore offered incentives, 
reasonably good infrastructure, and cheap labor and stable industrial relations climate as 
inducements to foreign companies. See Huff (1994) for a more detailed account of the 
nature and reasons for this shift.   
 The primary focus of skills development efforts was the urgent need for 
increases in technically trained manpower, both generally for the success of the of the 
EOI strategy, but also specifically to meet the needs of the emerging export industries, 
particularly in view of  limited success of the previous five year plan regarding technical 
education. For example, only 6% of secondary and junior high school graduates went for 
technical and vocational training. The government’s approach was to expand vocational 
institutions (9 new institutions were established), start the Singapore Technical Institute 
to provide to train instructors to staff the technical and vocational institutes, through the 
Ministry of Education (Vente and Chow, 1984).  
 The EDB, focused on meeting the short term needs of the foreign 
investors (recall that the development strategy was predicated heavily foreign 
investment).  The  general approach  was to request foreign governments, the UNDP, and 
foreign investors to fund and run training centers in specific skills and six centers in 
metal industries, prototype production, electromechanical industry, electrochemical 
industry, woodworking, and precision engineering and printing.  
 The welder crisis of 1970 (due to the rapid expansion of the ship repair industries 
and oil refining) further drove home to EDB the need for more investment in technical 
training. The EDB opened its  Overseas Training Scheme in 1971 (OTS), whereby 
Singaporean workers were sent by the EDB at government expense to various countries 
to work in companies in countries that were the biggest investors in Singapore (Germany, 
Japan, and the USA) where they could be trained for this purpose. Trainees were required 
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to sign a bond that they would work for the government for a minimum period of three to 
five years upon completion (Vente and Chow, 1984). The logical next step was to bring 
the kind of training that the OTS facilitated outside the country into the country, which 
the EDB achieved through the development of Joint Government Industrial Training 
Schemes (JGITS) during 1972-1975.  Under this system, the EDB provided foreign  
companies like Tata (India), Rollei (Germany) and Phillips (Netherlands) the finance and 
infrastructure to set up training centers to which the companies would contribute 
instructors and software. These schemes served three important goals: the provision of 
training that was not available in Singapore, the establishment of regular contacts with 
foreign firms, and  through these contacts, to induce foreign firms to invest in Singapore. 
This was the beginnings of the integration of skills and foreign investment and 
technology transfer. We will discuss the specifics of this emerging model of skills and 
technology transfer later in the paper.  
 These initiatives showed remarkable results. Within three years of the 
establishment of vocational training schools under the Industrial Training system, 
technical education enrollment had increased by a 1000% (Vente and Chow, 1984). And, 
by 1975 about 800 people had completed OTS training. Thus, in this phase, we see the 
EDB begin a networking arrangement that not only enticed companies to invest in 
Singapore, but through joint arrangements, ensure that these companies participated in 
the training of the Singapore workforce so that they were ensured of a steady supply of 
skills, but the country would also benefit from the training in a more general way  
 
Phase 3: Evolution Towards Technology Intensive Export Oriented Industrialization: 
1973-1984 
 As Huff (1994) suggests, the success of the export oriented  industrialization 
strategy resulted in both a tighter labor market and rising wages. And increased 
competition from lower cost Asian neighbors such as Malaysia forced the EDB to 
reconceptualize its economic development strategy. A critical aspect was the need to 
continue to attract foreign investment, but to make sure that the foreign investment would 
be higher quality, i.e. more technologically intensive investment that would be able to use 
the higher cost  Singapore labor. Thus, the shift contemplated was from labor intensive 
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manufacturing for export to a more higher value added technology intensive 
industrialization for export.  See Rodan (1989:119) for a more detailed description of this 
transition. This shift into more technology intensive higher skill based export orientation 
was accomplished through two major initiatives. One the one hand, the National Wages 
Council  recommended double digit wage increases for three years thus successfully 
driving out lower cost producers. On  the other hand, the government, via the EDB began 
to further restructure education and training in order to ensure that more higher skilled 
labor would be available for the higher technology based investment that was expected to 
come in. This investment was made possible by restructuring the incentive packages for 
foreign investors, and in particular giving special incentives to those investors who would 
set up research and development operations in Singapore (, Phoon, and Law 1996).  And 
during this phase, Singapore’s approach to skills development and up-gradation  
intensified. The specifics are discussed below.   
 The critical need during this phase was for the continued expansion of general 
skills (vocational and technical training for industry in trades such as machining, fitters, 
electricians, welders) as well as the need for more specialized skills germane to the 
industries that were growing as a result of foreign investment. The primary initiatives 
during this phase were: the reorganization of the structure for technical and commercial 
skill formation, establishing foreign company and country sponsored training centers, 
reforming the educational system, and setting in place incentives to get corporations to 
invest in skills upgradation  
 Through a process of reorganization of several government agencies, the 
Vocational and Industrial Training Board1 was established in 1979 to spearhead training 
strategies. It functioned as the country’s largest supplier of blue collar workers and 
technicians, as well as commercial, clerical and secretarial employees (Vente and Chow, 
1984).  Made up of 17 technical, vocational, and commercial training institutions, the 
range of its offerings are large (see Appendix 1), and it also manages the country’s 
Apprenticeship program (modeled on the German system). The Apprenticeship program, 
includes  basic training at one of VITB’s institutes and in plant training at companies (the 
apprenticeship contracts between companies and apprentices must be registered by the 
VITB, and there is close monitoring of  training. The VITB also became the national 
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authority for conducting examinations and certifying vocational and industrial training, 
and in this role has ensured a steady supply of  trained technicians for the industry. For a 
detailed description of the VITB, see Vente and Chow, 1984). 
 Meanwhile, the EDB deepened its short term focus on the acquisition and 
generation of specific skills by building on the model developed earlier i.e., establishing 
foreign country sponsored training centers, and capped these initiatives with the 
establishment of the EDB’s  institutes of technology (for e.g., the German-Singapore 
Institute for Production Technology, The French-Singapore Institute (FSI) of Electro-
Technology and Japan-Singapore Institute of Software Technology (JSIST) 
  However, both the Ministry of Education and the EDB also began to take a more 
strategic perspective on long term skills development while scrambling to meet short 
term needs, given in particular, the rapid pace of economic development. The 1979 
Ministry of Education report noted several problems with the education system, notably, 
the ineffectiveness of the bilingual system, the great variance in academic performance 
across schools that may cause potential skill imbalances in the future, low teacher 
morale, and wastage of educational resources. As a consequence, a new educational 
system was instituted (NES). In a later section this system is described in greater detail.  
 A final initiative during this phase was the effort of the EDB to shift some of the 
responsibility for upskilling onto the private sector. At the corporate level, the EDB tried 
to encourage companies  to invest in training, through the (ITGS)  Industrial Training 
Grant Scheme (the forerunner of the Skills Development Fund. All of the above 
initiatives are discussed in greater detail later in the paper.   
 In summary, during this phase of Singapore’s economic development, it appears 
that the Government had finalized its strategy for the supply of general technical skills 
through the VITB, while the EDB had deepened the integration of technology transfer 
and skills training. Further, the basis for longer term development of skills through 
education reform and the apportioning  of responsibility to the private sector for 
continuos skills upgradation through a levy/grant system.    
 While we discuss the EDB’s approach and the private sector levy/grant system in 
greater detail,  the evidence on the provision of general technical skills appear quite 
compelling. Survey results suggest that VITB training is generally considered to be good  
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and that  VITB trainees find employment more quickly and are better paid on average 
(Vente & Chow, 1984).  It offers a wide selection of full and part time courses, such that 
it gives full time workers an opportunity to upgrade skills. The part time courses offered 
are critical in view of the large numbers of older workers who are less skilled, and who 
have no option but to enhance their skills while working. Given Singapore’s acute labor 
shortage, it is important for companies to retain these older workers as well as to ensure 
that they upgrade skills. Interviews with a Training manager at the Singapore Institute of 
Human Resources Management (SIHRM), and managers at various banks, suggest that 
this aspect of the VITB has been of great importance in the context of upgrading skills of 
older workers. It is also the only outlet for students who do not pass the secondary school 
satisfactorily and who have no access to college. 
Phase IV:  Economic Diversification:  1985 - 1996:- Consolidation and Restructuring of 
Skills Development.  
 
 By the mid 1980s, Singapore was already a leading high-technology, and high 
wage goods producer in Southeast Asia (Bercuson, 1995). And much of the preparatory 
work in terms of establishing continuous skills development had already been put in 
place during the last phase. The economic development goal of the EDB for the 1990s 
was to make Singapore a regional business and financial hub. On the business side, the 
focus was on attempting to project Singapore as the logical choice for the location of 
research and development centers of various multinationals for their ventures in the 
Asian region. And on the financial and services side, Singapore hoped to become the 
most important financial center in the region.    
Consistent with this longer term vision, the EDB reconsidered its approach to 
skills generation.  One key finding was that the depth and breadth of technical skills 
necessary for the accomplishment of this vision could not be achieved through the 
existing model of single country dominated institutions, like the GSI, or a single 
company dominated institution, like Phillips.  In other words, the manpower needs of the 
new and emerging knowledge and technology intensive industries would require 
resources and expertise in excess of what a single partner could provide. And, as Soon 
(1993) notes, this would have to be accomplished without the proliferation of additional 
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training institutions.  
 What emerged from these is a series of initiatives to organize technology centers 
that were centered around the needs of one industry, through joint cooperation with 
various multinational companies who had invested in Singapore.  Several of the Training 
centers identified earlier (e.g., the German Singapore training center) were consolidated 
into institutions that served the entire industry, like the Precision Engineering Institute.   
 Second, there was increased integration across different institutions. For example,  
to give a further boost to apprenticeship training (under the VITB), the Skills 
Development Fund subsidizes up to 1/3 of the apprentice training costs of the company, 
working in concert with the National Productivity Board ( NPB) launched the OJT 2000 
plan in October 1993, and its goal is to train 700,000 apprentices by the year 2000.  In 
addition, the ITE and the NPB are also responsible for the education and training of 
working adults (which includes people who did not complete junior or secondary school 
or who are unskilled).  By 1991, there was a comprehensive system of continuing 
education and training making about 100,000 training places available to about 50,000 
workers a year (Chow, Phoon, & Law, 1996) Thus, this phase of Singapore’s economic 
development saw a consolidation and reorganization of skills development.  
 
 
Phase V: Towards a Knowledge based Economy 
  In the 1990s, the focus has been on the shift from factor driven growth to 
innovation driven growth, in other words, the shift from capital intensive industries to 
knowledge driven industries. The primary focus in this phase is an extensive push to increase 
corporate expenditure on training on the one hand, as well as devise alternatives for retraining 
the older workforce.  The Productivity Services board has identified thirteen industrial clusters 
of industries for whom skills have to be developed. HRD is seen as the most essential investment 
to ensure continued economic growth in Singapore in this phase. 
 
 The way in which these goals are to be realized are still evolving, but already there is a 
massive promotion of OJT in companies through the Productivity and Services Board which has 
created a system of model OJT companies that are to be emulated by the rest. In general, the 
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average investment of companies in training has increased in the last 10 years, from 1.8% of 
payroll to almost 4% of payroll.   The Skills development fund, which itself has seen an increase 
in participation, also provides special financial assistance for the training of supervisers  to 
deliver OJT.  
 
 In summary, the essential point that we wish to make in this section is fairly 
simple. What the discussion above shows is a fairly close correspondence or “fit” 
between the economic development needs and the skills development efforts, with a 
constant striving to meet industrial needs through quick short term solutions as well as 
some degree of long term planning. We think that this congruence is an essential pre-
requisite for the success of any skills development system, although not sufficient. By 
discussing these developments in some detail, we have provided a  overview of the 
Singapore’s efforts. In the next section, we discuss specific aspects in greater detail, 
notably the EDB’s model of technology transfer and how it evolved into an integrated 
system linking foreign investment and skills development. We will also discuss other 
factors crucial to Singapore’s success, i.e. the levy/grant system (skills development 
funds), and other related factors.  
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2. The EDB’s Evolving Model of  Technology Transfer, Foreign Investment, and 
Skills Development. 
 
 Perhaps the single most important factor in the success of  Singapore’s skills 
development system (and notably, the rapidity with which workforce skills were 
upgraded) was the EDB’s model of technology transfer, which effectively linked skills 
development to foreign investment and private sector participation. This model, that 
evolved over a 10 year period, in our view, is far more significant than the introduction of 
the skills development funds, although the latter has received the bulk of academic 
attention.  
 The early development of the EDB’s model commenced with the Overseas 
Training Scheme (OTS) described in Phase 2 of Singapore’s economic development. The 
purpose of the OTS was to have Singapore citizens trained abroad in companies that were 
large investors. Although the OTS was successful, it was more efficient if  such training 
could be provided locally by the investing firms. Thus, the first step focused heavily on 
targeting individual MNC’s and providing them with various inducements to invest as 
well as participate in the establishment of training centers.  
 The EDB here spearheaded the development of Joint Government Industrial 
Training  schemes (JGITS) during 1972-1975.  Under this system, the EDB provided 
foreign  companies like Tata (India), Rollei (Germany) and Phillips (Netherlands) the 
finance and infrastructure to set up training centers to which the companies would 
contribute instructors and software. Each training center was managed by  a Management 
Committee consisting of company representatives, EDB representatives, and 
representatives of the Vocational Industrial Training Board.  The JGITS is modeled after 
the German apprenticeship system with two parts, i.e., the first part consists of a two year 
full time in center training on both theory and practical aspects of the trade, followed by a 
two year approved in plant attachment in any company designated by the management 
board.  By 1984, the Tata Institute and the Rollei Institute had completed training for 
about 500 graduates each. And, numerous German companies offer the practical training 
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portion for the Rollei Institute.  
 In order to get a better sense of the relationship between EDB and foreign 
investor partnership, we examined one of these centers, the Tata_Institute in a little more 
detail. In return for the Tata  group’ contributions vis-à-vis training, the EDB granted 
loan finance to the TATA group in setting up their businesses in Singapore, reasonable 
industrial land rents, tax free remittances of technical fees, and various tax holidays 
(Soon 1993). For the center itself, the government provided land and buildings, paid for 
the purchase of the machinery and training equipment, and was responsible for 70% of 
the operating costs. The Tata Group was responsible for the provision of salaries to their 
instructors, and 30% of the operating costs.  In addition, as part of the agreement, the  
center would train twice number of persons that were required by the TATA group for 
their own operations. From the supply side, each trainee was provided with a stipend, but 
was to sign a bond agreeing to serve the government (or any company as directed by the 
EDB).      
 The Rollei Training Center also functioned on similar lines. This center offered 
training in precision mechanics, precision optics, tool making and electro mechanics. 
And the EDB provided Rollei with several major incentives to invest in Singapore. For 
example, it granted Rollei the right of refusal for a period of 10 years, i.e,., during this 
period, the wide range of products that Rollei would make  was placed under a “Control 
of Manufacture Ordnance” which required all other potential manufacturers of the same 
products to seek a license to produce, which would be granted only if Rollei first refused 
or declined to manufacture these products in Singapore.   
 Apart from the generous incentives provided to these companies, the key element 
with respect to skills is the guarantee to these companies that they would have first claim 
on the graduates of the training programs that they helped run. For example,  
roughly 44% of  graduates of the Rollei Institute were subsequently employed by Rollei 
and various German companies, while the rest found employment in other industries.  
The JGITS thus provided foreign quality training in Singapore at an affordable cost, 
without relocation of Singaporeans abroad, and most importantly, it provided skilled 
manpower that the industries needed currently, and ensured a steady supply of skills in 
the future.  
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 Faced with the rapid growth in foreign investment however during the 1970s, it 
was clear that focusing on individual companies alone would not be sufficient to provide 
the skills that the nation as a whole would need. Therefore, the EDB began to broaden its 
focus to deal with investor country governments. The logic was that if the government’s 
of the investing countries got involved, more training could be conducted, but more 
importantly that  would constitute a powerful signal to other companies in those countries 
that “Singapore was good place to invest”. 
 For example, the Japan-Singapore Government Training Center (JSTC)  was 
established largely because Singapore was deficient in key skill areas such as 
maintenance fitting, metal machining, electrical fitting, electronics instrumentation and 
mechanical areas, whereas Japan was a world leader in these. The JSTC was effectively 
used to promote Japanese investment notes Soon (1993), and served as an excellent 
public relations tool in attracting corporations in Japan.  This center, along with the 
Rollei, Tata, and Phillips centers were turning out almost 60% of the skilled craftsmen 
required by 1978. The courses and curriculum at these centers served as models for the 
various vocational training institutes. 
 Accordingly, in 1979, this center was started, and managed on the same lines as 
the Tata, Rollei, and Phillips centers, and functioned in exactly similar ways. Thus, this 
center, in addition to the Tata, Philips, and Rollei centers, played a critical role in both 
upskilling and attraction of the right kind of investment. For instance, they speeded up 
industrial training such that these. Most importantly, the establishment of these centers 
virtually assured the EDB of additional foreign investment from these companies as well 
as countries, as they became more sure that they would gain control over obtaining 
skilled craftsmen for their industries (aided no doubt by the fact that trainees had to sign 
agreements that they would work for these companies or the EDB after training).  Soon 
after the establishment of the Japanese training center, Germany and France also 
followed suit with centers of their own.  The focus of these centers was the training of 
skilled craftsmen.  
 In order to ensure the supply of highly skilled technicians, (at the high end) to 
these companies, the EDB established its Institutes of Technology, based on the same 
model described above.   These institutes were directed at training highly skilled 
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supervisors and foreman, and junior engineers. Each such institute would maintain close 
contacts with technology leaders from the industry, and the courses offered at these 
institutes would be more intensive and have greater practical relevance. The trainees 
were given financial assistance in the form of stipends, loans, and bursaries, and required 
to sign a three to five year bond.  
 The first such institute was the German-Singapore Institute for Production 
Technology, which was proposed in 1978, but finally assumed operations in 1982.  The 
German government provided both financial and technical assistance as part of German 
Development Aid, while the Singapore government provided land, buildings and 
equipment. The GSI offered the following courses  (Soon, 1993). Further, as of 1984, a 
total of 30 scholarships funded by the German Government has been offered to potential 
Singapore instructors to undergo training in Germany.  Upon repatriation, these locals 
formed the core of instructors and training officers at the Institute (Vente & Chow, 1984). 
 The French-Singapore Institute (FSI) of Electro-Technology was established 
jointly n 1983 by the EDB and the Ecole Superieure d’Ingenieurs en Electrotechnique et 
Electronique (ESIEE), a tertiary institute managed and operated by the French Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry.  The agreement on this joint training institute reached with 
the French government is similar to the one reached for the GSI.  Like the GSI, the FSI 
also requires that applicants have “A” Level qualifications, although since 1986, “O” 
Level holders are admitted on the condition that they complete an additional year of 
preparatory courses before they proceeding to the 2-year program (Soon, 1993). The 
trained technicians in the fields of electro-mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, 
electro-technology, and electronics with special emphasis on instrumentation, 
automation, industrial control, computer, and microprocessor applications.  The primary 
reason for French willingness to establish this institute was the anticipated increase in 
French exports to Singapore, although from the EDB’s perspective, this institute would 
also attract more investment from French firms, in the electronics sector (Vente and 
Chow, 1984).  
 The Japan-Singapore Institute of Software Technology (JSIST)   started 
operations in 1982.  This was consistent with the EDB’s  plan to develop a sophisticated 
export-oriented computer industry, and was also in anticipation of the rapid growth of the 
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computer software and services industry. Most significantly, it complemented the 
tremendous growth in electronics hardware industry in Singapore. Although financed by 
the Japanese government,  Japanese computer companies,  are responsible for supplying 
the instructors for the school since they are the experts in computer business applications.  
This was the first time that Japan had launched joint government(Japan)-Industry(Japan) 
efforts to promote the export of Japanese computers to Southeast Asia (Vente & Chow, 
1984). The main functions of the institute include:  1) The training of high-ranking  
officials from the private and public sectors in computer technology, and in particular, 
the training of software personnel; and 2) The provision of more advanced training for 
computer scientists, systems analysts, and computer programmers in Singapore (Vente & 
Chow, 1984) 
 The Japan-Singapore Technical Institute (JSTI) was the earlier discussed Japan-
Singapore Training Center (JSTC) that was upgraded to a technical institute in 1983. The 
JSTI now specializes in training skilled technicians in handling automated machines 
including industrial robots, Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machines, pneumatic 
and microprocessor-controlled equipment (Soon, 1993). 
 Thus, the EDB created a system of training  and upskilling that ensured supply of 
skilled craftsmen and skilled supervisors and technical people to the foreign investors. 
And although the number of trained people from the EDB’s institutes were small in 
number compared to the polytechnics, that small number constitute a critical course of 
skilled workforce which has played an instrumental role in Singapore’s economic 
development (Vente and Chow, 1984). While these practices provided skilled manpower 
for the present requirements, the EDB also began to take a more strategic view of longer 
term skills development given the maturity of its EOI strategy and the need for a more 
diversified industrial strategy (Kuruvilla, 1996).  
  Given the diversified strategy (Huff 1994) the EDB reconsidered its approach to 
skills generation.  One key finding was that the depth and breadth of technical skills 
necessary for the accomplishment of this vision could not be achieved through the 
existing model of  a single country dominated institutions, like the GSI, or a single 
company dominated institution, like Phillips.  In other words, the manpower needs of the 
new and emerging knowledge and technology intensive industries would require 
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resources and expertise in excess of what a single partner could provide. And, as Soon 
(1993) notes, this would have to be accomplished without the proliferation of additional 
training institutions. The EDB’s  “transnational” approach was to secure MNC 
cooperation to participate in joining training programs within the existing institutions.  
Thus the EDB’s model, which was based on single foreign partner for each training 
institute was expanded into a multinational partnership centered around relevant 
industries. One of the best examples of this effort has been the transformation of the 
Rollei center into the Precision Engineering Institute.  
 After the collapse of Rollei-Werke, Braunschweig, the Swiss MNC Brown-Boveri 
(Now Asea-Brown Boveri) took over the foreign partner role in the Rollei Institiute (it 
became the  Brown Boveri-Government Training Center (BBGTC) in 1982), and with 
the adoption of the multi-partner model, became the Precision Engineering Institute 
(PEI) in October 1988.  The Tata-Government Training Center (TGTC) was absorbed 
into the PEI.  This was soon followed by several firms participating in co-operation 
projects within the PEI in specific application technologies. These institutions are 
managed on the following lines. 
• EDB’s instructors and technical staff are to be trained in the participating firms  
      overseas locations. 
• All participants are to assist in the training curriculum and its development. 
• All participants are to provide and upgrade the equipment and software used for 
training. 
• All participants must commit for a minimum of three years. 
Some examples of centers within the PEI included: 
• Siemen-Nixdorf-EDB Center for Advanced Tool & Die Making 
• Mitutoyo-EDB Metrology Laboratory 
• Japan-EDB Computer Numerical Control Laboratory 
• Ikegai-EDB Computer Numerical Control Laboratory 
• Bridgeport-EDB Computer Numerical Control Laboratory 
• Sodick-EDB Computer Numerical Control Laboratory 
• Autodesk-PEI Computer Aided Design/Computer Aided Manufacturing Unit 
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 A perhaps even more significant example has been the transformation of the GSI 
(German Singapore Institute)  into a fully computer industry oriented training center, but 
also facilitating technology transfer into Singapore by putting together the skills of 
various Japanese, European, and US companies into one place.  For example, the EDB 
has successfully gotten agreement from several MNC’s for its key training institution in 
the computing sector, i.e., the German Singapore Institute.  Thus, Japanese companies 
such as Seiko, Japax, Sankyo Deiki, Matsushita and Mitutyo  contribute their equipment, 
knowledge, and training in the areas of Surface Mount Technology, IC design, Computer 
Numerical Control Technology, Manufacturing Resource Planning, and control 
engineering. European companies such as Siemens, Bull, Asea, Telemechanique and Carl 
Zeiss contribute their equipment and skills in the areas of artificial intelligence, laser 
technology, and vision technology, while American Firms such as Hewlett Packard, 
Autodesk, Mentor-Graphics provide equipment and expertise to train people in 
CAD/CAM, robotics, and simulation software.  
By establishing several transnational partnership within the same institution,  each 
partner firm was able to use not only the equipment and facilities of the EDB’s training 
institutions, but also the equipment and facilities of the other transnational partners. From 
the EDB’s perspectives, this arrangement would enable them to overcome the obstacles 
in any high technology training program, namely, the high costs of equipment, the lack of 
training expertise, and dealing with rapid obsolescence. Most importantly, though, this 
arrangement permits the EDB to acquire the necessary hardware, software, and teachware 
for the establishment and development of knowledge and technology intensive industries 
in Singapore. With the success of these efforts, several centers focused on different 
industries have been established.   These larger transnational projects, referred to as 
specialized training units and laboratories, enable EDB to undertake specialized training 
and continual upgrading training (CUT). (Soon, 1993).  
This model of technology transfer integrated with the attraction of foreign 
investment has been of pivotal importance in the generation of needed skills for foreign 
investors, but has also resulted in the upgradation of skills economy-wide, through the 
training of instructors for the various other vocational training centers in Singapore 
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(Soon, 1993). It is our view that  the EDB’s technology transfer model has played  a more 
central role than any other initiative in shaping the skills development scenario in 
Singapore.  
 
3. Skills Development Fund.  
 No discussion of the Singapore system will be complete without a discussion of 
the Skills development fund, largely because it is this institution that has been touted as a 
model for other countries. However, it is only one small part of a much larger process, 
and a part whose overall effectiveness is difficult to evaluate. The essential element of 
the SDF system is that it represents the Government’s efforts to pass on responsibility for 
skills upgradation to the private sector. The government-private sector partnerships  
established by the EDB implicitly in its model of technology transfer was limited to 
MNC’s but the SDF was targeted towards all Singapore businesses.   Given the need to 
upgrade skills quickly, consequent to the adoption of a higher EOI strategy in Phase 3, 
spurred to some extent by the increased wage costs and labor shortages, the EDB 
convinced the government that legislatively backed scheme was required (Earlier, the 
EDB had introduced the ITS, the industrial training grant scheme that provided  firms 
with EDB grants to upgrade skills, but the limited use of such grants and the costs 
involved convinced the EDB of a nationally applicable legislated effort). The Skills 
Development Fund System was established in 1984.  
 Employers are required to contribute 1% of gross salary of each employee earning 
below 1000 Singapore dollars per month (this would cover most blue and white collar 
workers) into the Skills Development Fund. Companies can get the value of their 
contributions back, or upto 80% of their contributions back, if they apply to the SDF for 
grants for training and skills enhancement. Companies could apply for grants to train 
workers, to buy more modern equipment, to expand or establish training facilities, or for 
overseas training. It also is a way to induce companies to continuously invest in skills 
upgradation, and it penalizes companies who persist in using low skilled workers in low 
value added operations by increasing their labor costs. The specific nature of the grants 
vary however. The rules include the following: Employers who submit a “Total Training 
Plan” affecting at least 50% of their workforce would be awarded with higher grants and 
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subsidies from the SDF;  Employers who provide workers with training in skills that are, 
or will be, in high demand would receive twice the usual training grant; Grants are 
typically awarded to companies who would use it to fund training programs necessary to 
enhance the expertise of the workers concerned;. The skills to be acquired must be of 
a high degree of specialization, complex in nature, or require a long period of training; 
The objective of the training program must be consistent with Singapore’s new economic 
strategy and direction;  Special incentives are provided for companies to train older 
workers aged 40 and above. 
 The EDB and the Government has been able to incorporate specific targets and 
programs to meet specific needs through the SDF. For example in recent years,  SDF 
focuses heavily on providing funds for training in the strategic clusters of industries and 
in 1996, the clusters that were targeted included robotics, product/ systems design, 
factory automation, and precision engineering for the manufacturing sector, and for the 
service sector, training in logistics management, advanced programming, and conference 
management.  It is also important to note that the specific nature of the schemes and 
initiatives that SDF either has started, or provided finance for, are varied, including 
programs to enable women to get back to the workforce, programs for older workers, 
basic education.    The introduction of the SkillsNet system, (a national training computer 
network that enables companies to submit applications for training grants electronically 
has eliminated processing time of applications for training subsidies from 7 weeks to 
three weeks.    
 And in order to encourage use the SDF, National Training Awards were 
instituted, which recognized companies who are committed to workforce training as 
determined by satisfying nationally established training criteria for a particular year. The 
SDF is managed by the EDB and a tripartite advisory council, formed by representatives 
from the government, industry, and trade unions.  The council establishes the guidelines 
for SDF application approvals, formulates the terms and conditions for grants and loans, 
determines the amount of financial assistance to be awarded to the applicants and handles 
appeals from rejected applicants.    
Corporations have reacted positively.  A 1990 National Productivity Board (NPB) 
survey showed that 29% of the workforce had undergone training and that companies on 
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average spent about 2.4% of their payroll on training. An evaluation of the SDF’s 
operations in 1996 suggests that through the SDF system, about one person out of every 
three Singapore employees will have training every year (an astounding 33% of the 
workforce undergoing skill upgradation annually) (Annual Report 1996, SDF).  On 
average, training expenses in companies have increased from 1% of payroll in 1986 to 
3.6% of payroll in 1996.  In particular, it is worth note that the SDF has increased 
significantly the participation of small and medium size companies. 
 The SDF’s strengths are that it is managed by the EDB, (which could structure 
grants to meet economic development needs), the fact that it uses both a carrot and stick 
approach, that it is advised by the tripartite actors (guaranteeing that all three actors are 
committed to the concept) and is flexible in terms of the kind of training programs that it 
funds (based on national or corporate needs.  An important indicator of success of the 
SDF system is the link between training and productivity. In the manufacturing sector, 
the industries that were the biggest investors in training (as per SDF figures) are also the 
most productive. For example, in the computer disk drive and peripherals industry, (the 
most intensive user of the SDF) the value added per workers exceeds 138000 dollars, 
which is twice the manufacturing average. This industry alone accounted for over 30% of 
the training places in 1995. In the service sector, companies in the transport and 
communications industry accounted for 24% of the training places in 1995, and the value 
added in this sector was 96000 dollars per workers, about one and a half times the 
average of the service sector (Annual Report, SDF). It is expected expect that by the end 
of the century, companies would be spending about 4% of their payrolls on training (note 
that the SFD requires a contribution of 1% only) and that 50% of the workforce would 
undergo 35 hours of training each year. 
 The SDF conforms to the classic levy/grant system suggested by Edwards (1997). 
Several countries have had variants of this system. Malaysia has the same system, while 
Korea had adopted a tax incentive for Companies to invest in training.  In depth 
evaluations of this system have not been conducted, although the available evidence 
suggests that the system is responsible for the fact that corporations spend 3.6% of their 
payroll for skills upgradation. The success of the system, however, should be seen in the 
larger institutional context and the EDB’s model of technology transfer.   
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  4. Long Term Skills Development: Education Policy 
 The above mentioned efforts focus on the creation of specific skills to meet 
immediate and medium term needs. However, successful skills development requires 
long term investments in education as well, given the considerable research on the impact 
of education in economic growth. In Singapore there have been two major reforms of 
education policy. The first was during the beginnings of import substitution 
industrialization soon after independence (discussed earlier) and the second was during 
the transition from low cost EOI to advanced EOI.  
 The move towards a more technology intensive export orientation coupled with 
the  initiatives for training  forced the government to rethink its education system, in 
particular to recheck whether the education policy planned in the 1960s was still relevant, 
given the rapid development since 1960s. The 1979 Education Ministry’s report  written 
by the Minister of Education Dr Goh Keng Swee, noted several problems in the 
Singapore education system, notably, that the bilingual policy was ineffective, there was 
a great variance in academic performance across schools, potentially causing future skill 
imbalances,  low teacher morale, and a large amount of wastage of educational resources. 
As a consequence of this report, a new educational system (NES) was instituted, on the 
following lines.  
 The traditional or formal education system consists of 1 year of pre-school 
education, six years of primary school education.  During the primary education, the 
focus would be to provide students with a solid grounding in mathematics and languages 
(33% of  teaching time devoted  to mathematics, 20%  to English and the mother tongue 
of each child, and the balance time left for other subjects).  In addition after Primary 
grade 4, based on their performance and potential, students would be divided into three 
major streams, the normal bilingual (English and mother tongue as the primary language 
of instruction), the extended bilingual (English as the primary language, mother tongue as 
the secondary language), and the monolingual (English, with mother tongue at oral 
proficiency levels only) streams. And parents participate to decide which is the 
appropriate stream.        
 At the end of six years of primary education, students would have to pass a nation 
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wide primary school leaving certificate examination (PSLE) to proceed to secondary 
school, and this exam tests them in English, mother tongue, math and science. Students 
who failed would continue to finish 10 years or education before going on to  various 
work related trainee schemes. Secondary education, (also free)  consists generally of four 
or five years  of education (depending on one’s performance) and after two years in 
secondary school, based on student performance, students are channeled into science, 
arts, commerce, or technical stream.  At the end of the secondary education, students 
must pass the Singapore Cambridge General Certificate of Education (GCE “O” levels), 
an exam which is conducted throughout the British commonwealth. After “O” levels, the 
student  then goes on to Junior college for two years before entering the university.  
 The rationale underlying this NES was as follows: For one, it would introduce a 
great deal of flexibility, in that the system was designed to accommodate students at 
different paces of learning, as well as providing them with different options in terms of 
focusing on their bilingual education. The common examinations on the other hand 
ensured a consistent standard.  And finally, the part of the education system that 
channelizes students into vocational courses if they do not show an affinity towards more 
academic work ensures like the German system, that there is a continuous stream of 
persons entering the industry after vocational or apprenticeship training. In addition, the 
streaming in the middle of the secondary school year into different disciplines and the 
prestige accorded to those who managed entry into the science stream would also ensure 
that the technical workforce that Singapore was seeking would be met. However, the 
strict nature of streaming has been criticized, since students are streamed into different 
language based instruction very early, and also are streamed into science, arts, or 
commerce, or technical streams before they are 13 years of age. This system (notes Pang 
Eng Fong1982) forces students to choose areas of specialization according to early 
academic performance rather than their natural inclinations so people who decide late get 
shot out of the system.  
  Along with education reform at the school level, there was also reform in the 
curriculum at the college level, particularly in engineering at the two major  universities, 
the National University of Singapore and the Nanyang Technological University. 
Notably, there was also an increase in funding for expansion of these two universities. In 
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addition four polytechnics have also received increased funding for expansion. See Soon 
et al for a detailed description of these. In addition, a fifth polytechnic (the Commercial 
and Service Polytechnic ) was established in 1984 to conduct studies and to prepare 
trainees for careers in the hotel trade and tourism, design, and computer sciences (Vente 
& Chow, 1984).  
In the 1990s, there has been need to rethink education policy issues again. One 
major criticism is that this need based and specific form of education and training for 
economic development needs has arguably turned out a lot of people who cannot think 
creatively, and thus broad and general education is suffering at the expense of specific 
job related skills training. Despite the World Competitiveness yearbooks ranking of 
number 1 in terms of the ability of the education system to meet the needs of a 
competitive economy, the Ministry of education’s own survey with employers to get 
feedback about its graduates provide a startlingly different picture. The survey found that 
graduates are competent, but lack creativity. They have good analytical abilities and are 
able to reason logically, but they are not strong on innovative or creative thinking and in 
dealing with problems that are not well defined. This is largely because of a focus on 
seeking good grades in examinations. This criticism echoes the criticism of American 
MBA students by companies who have begun to recruit liberal arts graduates in order to 
get better creative thinking individuals rather than the highly narrow focus of the MBA 
curriculum in the1990s. 
The lack of ability to think creatively, it is argued inhibits future development in 
that the system is producing employees, and not entrepreneurs.  The primary criticism is 
that students “ do not question the given” at all.   Although some have defended this on 
the basis of culture, (“we are more reticent, so the thoughts and ideas do not get 
expressed”, complaints from corporations and feedback from Ministry of Education 
surveys suggests that there is indeed some basis for this criticism. However, this criticism 
is not necessarily shared by all. For instance, Hewlett Packard has less problems with the 
quality of Singapore engineers (the mobile ink jet printer was designed and developed 
here in HP’s research and development operations) but they appear to have problems 
with the quantity.  Hence, they are forced to recruit from outside.  
 Notwithstanding the different views on quality, the Prime Minister, in September 
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1996, launched the Thinking Skills Program, to encourage better thinking in the schools. 
The objectives of the thinking skills program is to improve creativity and lateral thinking. 
Although there is agreement that there must be fundamental change in the education 
system at all levels to meet these objectives, the first steps are to develop open ended 
examination questions to test students ability to innovate and not just regurgitate 
information. In addition, the National University of Singapore has started a program 
where students will be expected to prepare papers and defend their views, as well as open 
book examinations, so that memorizing will not be the primary route to success at 
examinations.  
 A second reason to focus again on education reform centers around Singapore’s 
longer term economic goal of becoming a regional research and development center. 
Based on forecasts that identified a severe shortage of scientists and engineers, the 
government recently announced a 2.8 billion UAS dollar plan to boost the pool of 
research scientists from 7900 in 1986 to 13000 by the year 2000. This demand will be 
met by a combination of immigration, as well as increasing local output. One strategy to 
increase local output has been  to increase the number of females who take engineering 
classes, and at Nanyang Tech, female enrollment in engineering courses have increased 
from 15% to 23% in the last year (FEER November 14th, 1996). 
 
5. A Concerted National Effort Through a Web of Institutions.  
 We have discussed the major features of the skills development system in 
Singapore. However a crucial ingredient in the success of the system is the way in which 
these institutions work in practice. Clearly there is a concerted national effort here 
occurring at different levels in the nation. Many features of the system indicate the 
national and concerted effort.  First, the system operates at several different levels, 
including education systems, training for managers, training for high-level technical 
skills, training for lower level technician skills, training for blue collar workers and older 
workers, and training for productivity improvement. It thus covers a wide spectrum. 
Second, it is done by both the government and the private sector, through a system of 
partnerships. The joint programs with the private sector are both numerous and diverse, 
including industry based centers such as the oil industry, firm based centers, jointly 
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government-private sector institutes. Third, the different government institutions such as 
the ITE and the NPB work in tandem to provide courses, despite being different 
government departments. Thus, a network or web of institutions that work together is 
established.  Fourth, there is input from different actors in the country at most levels. All 
the government run institutions are managed by a tripartite board with representatives of 
government, management, and labor, while the joint Singapore-Foreign government 
institutions have similar tripartite advisory committees. In this way the critical actors in 
industry have a voice in terms of the objectives and methods of skill training. 
 A pictorial representation of the institutional web in Singapore is provided in 
Figures 1-5.  
Insert Figures 1-5 about here. 
  
 As these figures suggest, not only is the web of institutions fairly complex and 
developed, but there is constant exchange of information across different organizations. These 
charts do not purport to be an indication of organizational structure, but more an indication of 
where the different institutions are located. Figure 1 shows the institutions at the primary level. 
The black lines indicate reporting relationships, while the broken lines indicate instances where 
there is coordination and communication between the parties. It is important to note that these 
broken lines hide a lot of institutional cooperation. For example the cooperation between the 
EDB and the NPB is quite complex, as they have jointly designed a number of the training 
programs run by the NPB listed in the Appendix.  The red lines suggest the areas where there is 
tripartite input, either through tripartite representation on the boards of the institutions or 
tripartite advisory councils.  
 Figure 2  shows a sub section of Figure 1 in that it focuses solely on the Economic 
Development Board and its related institutions. Note that linkages with other institutions are not 
represented in this figure.  Figure 3 then focuses on the Institute of Technical Education and its 
affiliated institutions, while Figure 4 depicts the National Productivity Board and its institutions 
and programs. Figure 5 shows broadly the education establishment in Singapore, while Figure 6  
lists the various industry training activities, but does not show the reporting relationships or 
linkages with other institutions, largely because many of these are free standing programs. 
 In particular, this web of institutions has been managed through frequent 
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consolidations and reorganizations to maximize effectiveness, and has facilitated a rapid 
diffusion of skills development, while at the same time maintaining the relevance  the 
effort. We provide some examples of these aspects below.  
Consolidation for Effectiveness and Diffusion 
 The government has continually reshaped institutions to maximize effectiveness. 
For example, given the vast growth in the skills development and vocational training 
institutions over the 1973-1984 period, there was some need for restructuring and 
coordination. The Council for Professional and Technical Education (CPTE), created and 
chaired by the Minister for Trade and Industry was established in 1979.  Its function is to 
coordinate training conducted by the universities, the polytechnics, and the technical 
institutions of the EDB and the VITB to match the economic challenges (Chow, Phoon, 
& Law, 1996). CPTE is invested with the responsibility of ensuring that the pool of 
trained people would be adequate, and for recommending to universities, polytechnics, 
vocational institutes, and EDB’s training institutions, enrollment targets, staffing, and 
financial requirements for their different departments.  These targets are consistent with 
the current and potential future demand in the labor market (Soon, 1993).  
 Once the multinational partnerships were established, the EDB stepped in 
again to consolidate its higher level skills program through the establishment of Applied 
Technology Group (ATG) in 1985. The primary function of this group is to manage the 
various different larger transnational projects that the EDB has entered into.  These larger 
transnational projects, referred to as specialized training units and laboratories, enable EDB 
to undertake specialized training and continual upgrading training (CUT). (Soon (1993). 
Besides serving as showcases of application technologies, the ATG has been able to use 
them to offer specialist manpower development programs and up to date CUT programs. 
These programs include training of a vast array of people, including IC design Engineers, 
automation engineers, tool and die designers, surface mount technicians, and advanced 
craftsmen, at various levels, including post graduate levels. 
 Further, the VITB discussed earlier was reorganized and upgraded to the status of 
a post secondary institution, called the Institute for Technical Education (ITE), formally 
established on April 1, 1992. The ITE is a union of the Industrial Training Board (ITB), 
the Adult Education Board (AEB), and the Vocational & Industrial Training Board 
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(VITB).  Its new mission includes the need to function as a post-secondary training 
institution providing and regulating industrial training and development (e.g., regulating 
and developing certifications and standards for technical skills), provide secondary 
school leavers with higher level skills training, wider career options, and a potential 
second chance to pursue a polytechnic or a university track, to promote, regulate, and 
intensify industry-based training in technical skills (e.g., apprenticeship and On-the-Job 
Training OJT),  to increase training rigor and to give it a greater practical bias, and to 
serve as a consultant on technical training, and also to do research in this area. 
 The process of consolidation also enhanced the diffusion of skills development. In 
every case the different centers jointly established with different companies or 
governments were ultimately taken over by the Government or the EDB. For example, 
the German Printing School established in Phase 2  was later absorbed into the 
Baharuddin Vocational Institute. The Rollei and other institutes was taken over to form 
the PEI. In April 1987, for example, the JSIST came under the control of the Singapore 
Polytechnic.  By this process the government acquired ownership of the curriculum and 
ensured its wide-spread diffusion throughout the web of training and skills development 
institutions.  
 The consolidation in some areas resulted in more integration both through the 
reshaping of old institutions as well as joint collaboration across institutions.  One 
example can be seen in the role of the National Productivity Board. The National 
productivity board although established in1973 as a department under the EDB has now 
been made independent. The NPB’s purpose is to facilitate the improvement of 
productivity across all sectors and industries, which it does through the provision of 
specialized training programs that are focused on productivity improvement.  The NPB 
also plays a key role in ensuring that the impetus for training is maintained, and that it is 
affordable and available to all. The NPB role is quite critical, since in the name of 
increasing national productivity, its focus and programs cuts across industries, sectors, 
and age groups in the economy. 
  In another example of collaboration,  to give a further boost to apprenticeship 
training, the SDF and the NPB jointly launched the OJT 2000 plan in 1993, with the 
objective of training 70,000 apprentices by the year 2000. To spur this effort, the SDF 
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subsidizes up to 1/3 of the apprentice training costs of the company.  Another example 
related to the ITE and NPB have jointly created a comprehensive system of continuing 
education for working adults (people who did not complete junior or secondary school or 
who are unskilled), and by 1992 they had put in place  a comprehensive system of 
continuing education and training making about 100,000 training places available to 
about 50,000 workers a year (Chow, Phoon, & Law, 1996). 
  In addition, the relevance of skills development is maintained through the various 
feedback loops. Each institution has ties with the real world in terms of getting 
information and advice as to what kind of training is necessary so there is continuous 
feedback. For example, in terms of  ITE, there are Trade Advisory Committees 
comprised of tripartite members, and in terms of the Skills Development Funds, there are 
tripartite advisory councils. In other areas, particularly in the area of specialized skills, 
relevance is maintained because various EDB sponsored skill upgradation programs are 
in reaction to the felt needs of the industry, or are relevant because the provision of these 
skills is critical to the successful attraction of foreign investment. Given that most of the 
institutes of technology and engineering are jointly managed by the EDB or appropriate 
government and the foreign investor, and where the investing companies have the first 
choice of trainees, maintaining relevance is highly necessary. The relevance of  programs 
is also evident in the large numbers of programs created for special needs (see Appendix 





 In this paper, we have attempted to describe the major elements in the skills 
development system of Singapore. We find that the several features contribute to its 
success, notably the general integration of skills development and economic development 
achieved by making the EDB responsible for both activities, the EDB’s evolving model 
of technology transfer that has effectively linked skills development with foreign 
investment and joint government-private sector management of training to ensure the 
development of appropriate skills. These efforts are supported by education reform and 
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skills development funds that induce each employer to invest in upgrading skills, in a 
context where different institutions work in collaboration to meet skills development 
goals.  
 In many ways, the Singapore example provides very strong support for the notion 
that government’s do have a significant role to play in skills development.  The type of 
government clearly matters though, and Singapore’s government has been noted for its 
technocratic approach However, the case suggests that apart from the type of government 
institutions,  the method by which the system is implemented also matters. Perhaps the 
most significant institutional detail is the fact that the responsibility for economic 
development and skills development rests with the same authority i.e., the EDB, and that 
there is significant private sector involvement and partnership with government  in skill 
formation and  development. Given the breadth and depth of Singapore’s approach, it 
would seem to be a good example of what Singh (1990) terms a national and concerted 
effort.  
 
Sustainability and Transferability Issues 
 
 Is the skills development system in Singapore capable of addressing the 
challenges that lie ahead?  The vision for the future is one in which Singapore is a 
knowledge based economy, a regional research and development center, and a nation of 
entrepreneurs.   The government has been very clear that it needs to ramp up its 
production of research and scientific people, and although large amounts of money is 
earmarked for such efforts, there is agreement that in the near term, these needs will be 
met by immigration.  More important perhaps is the problem that of a lack of creativity 
and critical thinking that has been identified by many foreign investors and recognized by 
the Government.  The argument is that Singapore has turned out competent people who 
follow orders well but are not creative.  
 The government last year launched the CRESP program, focusing on the 
expansion of critical skills throughout the high school experience and is retooling 
curriculum and exams to get future students to be more creative.  They have sent a study 
team to Silicon valley to understand better the creativity required in running a knowledge 
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based economy.  However, Silicon valley is a very informal setting with a culture that 
practically encourages failure or at least, does not penalize attempts at creativity that are 
not successful. Singapore, on the other hand is a more regimented system where the 
government is the primary player and is unforgiving about mistakes.  Clearly, it is not 
possible to "manage" creativity of the sort found in Silicon valley, and to replicate those 
conditions in Singapore would require the recognition that a large number of political, 
social, and economic factors are responsible for the creativity in the USA, and also that 
engendering such creativity is a long run tendency, not a short term problem.  Therefore, 
the key question regarding the future sustainability of the Singapore skills development 
system is whether they can make the transition to meet the next challenges smoothly 
enough .  
 
Transferability Issues 
 To what extent is the Singapore system transferable to other nations. We must 
recognize of course that there are several facilitating conditions that make the system 
successful in Singapore's context.  First, industrialization in Singapore has been fairly 
narrowly focused, on a relatively small number of industries, mostly in electronics. With 
such a small breadth of industry, it is relatively easier to ensure the supply of adequate 
skills for these industries and the backward and forward linkages that these industries 
have generated. Second, the performance oriented culture of Singapore’s government 
(legitimacy drawn to a considerable extent from national economic performance), 
coupled with the technocratic nature of the government bureaucracy has certainly helped 
in the design and delivery of skill formation mechanisms.  (In a recent book Schein, 
(1996) documents the nature of organizational culture at Singapore’s Economic 
Development Board, noting its strategic pragmatic focus).   Besides, we must also 
remember that Singapore’s rapid growth has been under conditions of labor shortage as 
well, which provides its added incentive for rapid upskilling,  unlike in labor surplus 
countries such as the Philippines and India, where the urgency does not exist. Fourth, the 
government is the main driver of economic activity in a capitalist country, a unique 
situation. Fifth, Singapore has relatively small informal sectors and no rural sector. Sixth, 
the tripartite system in Singapore is unique in Asia.   For these reasons, one might argue 
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that the Singapore system is a case of "Singapore exceptionalism".  
 What are the lessons for other developing nations from this experience?. Already several 
countries have shown interest in introducing the skills development funds system given its 
apparent success in Singapore. Our study would imply that such transplanting of successful 
institutions is fraught with danger. It is an increasingly accepted axiom in industrial relations that 
attempts at transplanting successful systems from one country to another without taking into 
account the context in which that system operates is bound to result in failure (Katz, Kuruvilla, 
and Turner, 1994).  Kuruvilla (1997) and Hiers and Arudsothy (1999) suggest for example, that 
Malaysia efforts to introduce enterprise unions following Japan’s success with them have not 
quite provided the same result. The skills development fund system is successful in Singapore 
because it is part of an institutional context where several different institutions and practices 
work together to increase workforce skills, and it is difficult to ascribe responsibility to only one 
institution out of many. Besides, the factors that have caused success here may not quite cause 
the same success elsewhere.  
 However, there is much to learn herein terms of principles that will be of use to other 
nations whose economic development strategies are similar to that of Singapore, namely, moving 
from low cost exports driven by foreign investment to higher technology intensive exports. In 
particular, the principle of  a close fit between economic development planning and workforce 
skills would be a necessary condition for most Asian economies. Most economies in Asia have 
some form of economic planning, done by the Finance or economics ministry, but the human 
resource future is the province of the HR or education ministries or government departments, and 
there is little coordination across these three Ministries or departments.  Investing one authority 
with responsibility for both economic development and HR planning brings about a more tightly 
coupled "fit".  This is an important lesson. Second, for those nations that depend heavily on 
foreign investment of economic development, the EDB's model of technology transfer has clear 
relevance. Third, it must be realized that not all government cultures are similar to that of 
Singapore's government culture, and hence, other countries may be wise in subcontracting some 
of the administrative operations to the private sector in new forms of public-private partnerships. 
In particular, one lesson is that the collaboration between the private and public sectors could be 
used to deliver other aspects of workforce preparedness, such as active labor market policies in 
other Asian nations. The key challenge for other nations is to take these principles, but then 
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design appropriate institutions for the realization of these objectives.   
 Finally it is important to view this study as being exploratory, as it has several major 
limitations. We have the international acclaim and recognition that Singapore has gained as the 
best indicator of the skills development system’s success, although we have not specifically 
looked at objective data in Singapore to make that claim. Second, we have not articulated a 
research strategy that will allow us to answer the crucial question of the relative importance of 
different factors in the success of the system, a necessary step to make a real resolution to the 
debate on the role of government in improving workforce skills. There is an urgent need to 
design an evaluation system to look at Singapore's success. Yet, there is value in this descriptive 
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Appendix 1:  ITE Courses 
 
a. Worker General Education:
 
The Basic Education for Skills Training (BEST) and the Worker Improvement through 
Secondary Education (WISE) are two national worker education programs offered by the ITE.  
BEST was introduced in 1983, and its purpose is to upgrade the English language and Math 
skills of workers up to the Primary Six level.  WISE was introduced in 1987 with the motive of 
further upgrading the English and Math skills of workers up to the Secondary 4 Normal Level. 
These two programs are meant for those who some reason or other (typically the older 
generation who already passed schooling age when Singapore started its education reform plans 
after independence) missed their basic education opportunity during their early years.  The 
programs serve to provide this group with the basics necessary for the many upgrading and 
retraining programs that Singapore has.  The program is flexible in that they are administered 
during office hours, evenings and/or weekends.  
 
Continuing Education (CE) programs at varying levels from Secondary 1 up to GCE “A” 
Levels (Junior College Level) are also available to provide workers with the chance to attain 
even higher levels of education.  It is again very flexible in its schedule in that it can be taken 
part-time or during the weekends (Brief on the ITE). 
 
 
b. Worker Skill Training:
 
The programs here also serve to give poorly educated and low skilled workers the basic 
foundation upon which they can acquire new and higher skills.  The ITE has three schemes under 
this, namely MOST, TIME, and ACTS, and a description of each is as follows:  (Brief on the 
ITE) 
 
Modular Skills Training (MOST) 
 
This was launched in 1986, and it offers a range of 128 skill training modules which will 
lead to certification at NTC-2, NTC-3, and Certificate of Competency (CoC) levels.  It is meant 
to upgrade people who did not complete high school so that they can acquire new and higher 
level skills (Chow, Phoon, & Law, 1996).  This can be self, company or union sponsored 
financially.  It is conducted in the evenings or weekends in order to avoid work disruption, and 
to date it has benefited about 46,700 workers. (*To date is Jan 1996). 
 
Training Initiative for Mature Employees (TIME) 
 
This was launched in 1991 targeted at upgrading needs of workers above 40 years old as 
this group has been identified as the most vulnerable group to changes in industry trends and 
technology.  It has an open-entry system, is offered in four languages (this is to permit workers 
who are illiterate in English to undertake skill training), and workers can attend TIME courses 
on company’s time.  Again, this can be self, company or union sponsored financially.  To date, 
 48
1,610 workers have benefited from it. 
 
Adult Co-operative Training Scheme (ACTS) 
 
This was launched in 1992 targeted at lowly skilled and poorly educated workers 
between 20-40 years of age to acquire more skills via apprenticeship type of training (Consisting 
of on- and off-the-job training.  Trainees here have to be fully sponsored by their employers, and 
to date, 550 workers have benefited. 
 
 
c. Industry-Based Training (IBT):
 
With ITE’s approval, companies or industry associations possessing the requisite 
infrastructure and expertise can set up training centers conducting skill specific training leading 
to ITE certification.  There are currently 60 ITE approved training centers and since 1990, 6,420 
workers have been trained under this scheme (Brief on the ITE). 
 
 
d. Customized Skills Training:
 
The ITE also administer skill training programs that are tailored to the specific needs of 




e. Certified OJT Training Center (COJTC) Scheme:
 
This was launched in April 1994 to encourage companies with a commitment to training 
and have the proper infrastructure to put their workers through OJT.  Companies meeting the 
requests can implement customized OJT programs for their workers, who upon completion 
would receive OJT certificates.  These certificates would be recognized by ITE, and can be used 
for gaining entry into ITE’s NTC courses.  To date, 201 companies have been registered and 
16,000 workers have received skills training under the COJTC Scheme.  ITE hopes to register 




First Industry-Wide On-the-Job Training (OJT) Program for the Process Industry:
 
.  The program was initiated by 6 major oil companies in October 1995, namely DuPont, 
Esso, Mobil, Shell, Singapore Petrochemical Complex, and the Singapore Refining Company, 
and 5 government agencies, namely Construction Industry Training Institute (CITI), EDB, ITE, 
NPB, and the Ministry of Labor.  This is to train workers who perform specialized job functions 
and who do not need broad-based technical training.  Over the next 5 years, over 5000 workers 
from 60 contractor companies would be trained under structured OJT.  The 60 companies are 
also expected to set up in-house Certified On-the-Job Training Centers (COJTCs) that have to be 
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approved by the ITE.  Typically, ITE would give COJTC status to companies with high quality 
OJT practices and programs.  As for companies failing to meet the requisites, ITE even offers to 
train the companies= trainers so that the company can too acquire the COJTC status.  Workers 
who attain the Certificate of Competency from these structured OJTs can proceed to take up 
relevant ITE courses (Quality Workforce, Dec 95/Jan 96, Issue 24, ITE). 
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This offers workers having family and work commitments with flexible training 
programs.  It also accommodates workers who have little access to conventional training centers 
because of the lack of time or formal qualifications (Chow, Phoon, & Law, 1996). 
 
On-the-Job Training Program: 
 
With the help of Seiko Instruments of Japan, this program assist companies in developing 
and implementing on-the-job training and in-company skills training (Chow, Phoon, & Law, 
199_). 
 
Information Technology Program for Office Workers: 
 
Known as IT Power, this is a 56-hour nationally driven program jointly developed by the 
NPB, SDF, IBM, National Computer Board (NCB), and the Singapore Telecom.  It serves to 
give office workers a total perspective on information technology (including IT concepts and 
applications, and office automation), and to equip them with transferable keyboard skills.  It is 
the only comprehensive generic program that covers word processing, spreadsheet, and database 
(Chow, Phoon, & Law, 1996). 
 
NPB-Anderson Training Technology Center: 
 
This center was formed in 1990 via the joint-partnership between Anderson Consulting 
and NPB.  It optimizes the use of technology to replace instructor led training programs.  It 
promotes the used of TT-based training among companies in Singapore in the areas of 
Computer-Based Training (CBT), Interactive Videodisc Instruction (IVI), Digital Video 
Instruction (DVI), and Computer-Managed Instruction (CMI).  It also helps companies convert 
their instructor-led training programs into TT-based programs (Chow, Phoon, & Law, 1996). 
 
 
Increasing Training Opportunities (INTRO) Scheme: 
 
This provides incentives for companies to share their in-house expertise, facilities, and 




This 40-hour program was jointly developed by the Civil Service Institute, the NPB 
Institute for Productivity Training, the Singapore Institute of Management, the Singapore 
Institute of Personnel Management, the Singapore National Employers Federation, and the 
Singapore Training and Development Association.  The program’s competency-based training 
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provides managers and supervisors with the skills needed to identify training needs of their staff, 
and to conduct individual or group training programs (Chow, Phoon, & Law, 1996). 
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Figure 1:  Skills Development Institutional Web at the Primary Level
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Figure 2:  Economic Development Board and Related Primary Level Institutions
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 Figure 3:  Institute for Technical Education and Related Primary Institutions
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 Figure 4:  National Productivity Board and Related Institutions 
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Skills Development Fund  
 
    The Skills Development Fund (SDF) provides incentive grants for training those in the workforce, those preparing to join the 
workforce, and those 
    re-entering the workforce. The grants are financed by collections from the Skills Development levy imposed on employers with 
workers earning $1,000 or 
    less a month. The current levy rate is 1%. Grants are awarded on the basis of a cost-sharing principle and the training must be 
relevant to the economic 
    development of Singapore. The amount of SDF grants that a company can obtain is not tied to the levy 
    contribution.  
 
         Eligibility Criteria  
 
              All companies registered or incorporated in Singapore  
              Training is fully sponsored by companies  
              Workers who are Singaporeans, permanent residents of Singapore or three-year work permit / Q2 
              pass holders.  
 
         Funding Mechanism  
 
         The SDF's focus is worker* training. To support this focus, a set of funding guidelines has been 
         established. The funding mechanism is as follows :  
 
              A flat rate of $4 per trainee per hour for all broad-based training irrespective of whether 
              training is conducted by company's own instructors or third party providers.  
              Course fee support for external training leading to national / industry-wide certification at 80% 
              subject to a maximum grant of $8 per trainee per hour. For in-house training leading to 
              national / industry-wide certification, enhanced incentive at $6 per trainee per hour will be 
              provided.  
              80% of course fee support for external training in critical high-end / pioneering areas. For 
              in-house training in these areas, enhanced incentive will be provided at $8 per trainee per hour. 
              A flat rate of $80 per trainee per day for overseas training programmes conducted within Asia 
 60 
              and flat rate of $120 per trainee per day for overseas training outside Asia, subject to a 
              maximum supportable training period of 6 weeks.  
 
         (* Workers are defined as employees who earn $1,000 & below and/or have 'A' level qualifications 
         & below)  
 
         What a Training Programme Must Have to Qualify for Support  
 
              Specific performance objectives  
              Schedule of training activities/lesson plans  
              Specified duration of training  
              Guided instruction, ie, conducted by qualified instructors  
              Test(s) to assess attainment of training objectives  
 
         Programmes that are Not Supported  
 
              Seminars and conferences designed to stimulate discussions and/or keep participants abreast 
              of the latest trends in skills upgrading  
              Induction/orientation programmes, appreciation programmes or programmes specific to 
              company procedures/policies  
              Training for spiritual, cultural and social enhancement, eg. religious studies and appreciation of 
              music  
              Professional-training programmes, involving the upgrading of personnel such as doctors, 
              lawyers, accountants and architects  
              Postgraduate training programmes, involving the pursuance of higher education leading to the 
              award of an advanced diploma, graduate diploma, degree or post-degree qualification  
              Senior management courses or top management programmes designed to give high level 
              executives a wider business perspective  
              Attachment of engineers and senior managers to advance their skills and knowledge in existing 
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